Introduction
A growing body of research argues that executives value stock and option grants at less than their market value (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Hall and Murphy, 2000a,b,c; and Muelbrook, 2000) . In these models, an executive begins with a holding of firm equity and he is given a grant of options. Following the grant, he must hold both his initial firm stock and the option grant indefinitely. This assumption means that a grant of options permanently imposes extra risk on the executive, and therefore it is intuitive that he discounts the value of the options. Said another way, because the option grant imposes additional risk, it increases the incentives provided to the executive. Accordingly, the option grant serves both as incentives and as compensation, and it is not meaningful to compare its value with a payment that is purely compensatory.
In this paper, we provide an alternative perspective in which the executive does not discount the value of the equity grant. We assume that as part of its contract with an executive, the firm requires the executive to hold a specific amount of equity incentives. Our basic insight is that when a firm grants stock or options solely as compensation, it allows the manager to rebalance his equity portfolio so that the equity grant does not impose additional incentives on the executive. In this case, the stock or option grant does not increase risk, and the executive does not discount the value of the equity grant. On the other hand, if the equity grant is used to increase incentives, we recognize that the executive will discount the value of the grant because it is not purely compensatory.
The intuition for these contrasting results can be seen from the following example.
Assume that an executive has wealth of $20 million that she prefers to hold in a combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio, but that $10 million of this wealth is constrained to be invested in the firm's stock. Further, assume this executive receives a stock grant with a market value of $1 million. To see the intuition of the prior results referenced above, assume that the executive cannot sell any of her existing holdings and cannot rebalance her portfolio holdings at the time of an equity grant. After the grant, she has $11 million in firm equity, which imposes additional risk and incentives on the manager and moves her further away from her preferred portfolio holdings. As a result, she discounts the value of this $1 million equity grant.
The intuition for our results can be seen from changing the assumptions of the prior example as follows: Assume that the executive's holdings of $10 million in firm equity are not exogenously specified, but are instead part of a contract between the executive and the firm, which requires her to hold exactly $10 million dollars of equity incentives. To meet the executive's reservation wage, the firm pays her a risk premium to compensate her for holding firm stock in excess of what she would prefer in the absence of the contract. Finally, assume that the executive is allowed to rebalance her portfolio holdings after the equity grant, provided that she maintains the agreed level of incentives. Now consider how this executive values a stock grant of $1 million. Because she is allowed to rebalance her portfolio and sell $1 million of her existing stock holdings at their market value and still maintain her contracted level of firm equity, the executive will not discount the value of the equity grant. Using similar logic, we show that the executive also will not discount the value of an option grant.
Note that a key feature of our analysis is that we consider the executive's valuation of stock and option holdings separately from her valuation of a new grant of stock or options. We agree that when a firm imposes risk and incentives on a risk-averse executive by making her hold equity as part of a contracting arrangement, the executive values the equity at less than its market value. However, under an assumption that changes in the value of equity holdings and new grants of equity do not alter the level of required holdings, the executive values a new equity grant at its expected value because she is allowed to rebalance her portfolio back to the required holdings.
Assumptions about portfolio rebalancing are critical to any analysis of executives' valuation of stock and options. At one end of the spectrum, some previous studies allow no rebalancing, and accordingly, when an executive receives a stock or option grant, additional risk is permanently imposed on the executive. At the other end of the spectrum, we allow (require) the executive to sell (to purchase) equity when the risk imposed on the executive increases above (falls below) the contracted level, so that the executive always bears the contracted amount of risk.
While actual contracting and rebalancing behavior is likely to vary across firms, the assumptions underlying our framework are consistent with much of the extant empirical evidence on cross-sectional variation in executives' equity incentives, firms' stock and option granting practices, and executives' portfolio rebalancing behavior. For example, empirical evidence suggests that: (1) the level of executive equity incentives is not random, but varies with firm characteristics consistent with contract theory (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Core and Guay, 1999) ;
(2) firms write contracts requiring executives to hold minimum levels of equity (Core and Larcker, 2001) ; and (3) executives rebalance their portfolios in response to stock price changes and new grants of equity (e.g., Janakiraman, 1998; Ofek and Yermack, 2000; Core and Guay, 2001 ).
Knowing the appropriate method of valuing stock-based compensation and the incentives provided by these securities is important for empirical compensation researchers. Researchers traditionally use a market valuation model, such as Black-Scholes (1973) , to value grants of options, to value the executive's option portfolio, and to estimate the incentives provided by option portfolios (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Core and Guay, 1999) . Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2000c) suggest that researchers should adjust the executive's valuation of equity compensation and incentives to reflect his risk-aversion and lack of diversification. In this paper, we argue that risk-adjusting executive compensation is not necessary provided that the maintained hypothesis of the research is that the executive's equity compensation and portfolio holdings are part of a contract between the firm and executive.
The notion that firms require executives to hold firm-specific wealth as part of a contract also has implications for the relative performance evaluation (RPE) prediction that an efficient contract exposes executives to the firm's idiosyncratic return, not its systematic return.
Specifically, under an assumption that the executive prefers to hold her wealth in the market portfolio, the contract described above requires the executive to hold less of the market portfolio than she prefers and more of the firm's equity than she prefers. That is, consistent with the RPE prediction, the executive satisfies the contract by taking a short position in the market portfolio (i.e., holding less of the market portfolio relative to her preferences) and taking a long position in firm equity. This analysis suggests that executive contracts are likely to be more consistent with RPE than has been found by previous empirical research that has not considered the structure of the executives' other wealth (for a summary of this literature, see Murphy, 1999) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we follow prior research and present a parsimonious expected utility model to show how an executive values a grant of stock or options when these securities impose additional risk on the executive and no portfolio rebalancing is allowed. We expand this model in Section 3 to add an assumption that the executive and the firm enter into a contract that specifies a required level of risk exposure for the executive and allows the executive to rebalance her portfolio when risk deviates from the contracted level. In Section 4, we illustrate how the framework in Section 3 is consistent with employment contracts that incorporate relative performance evaluation. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5.
Compensation valuation when an executive cannot rebalance
This section summarizes and critiques the arguments that have led some prior researchers to conclude that executives value stock-based compensation at other than market value. We show that restrictions on rebalancing and investment choices in this literature give rise to scenarios where a manager can place either a discount or a premium on the valuation of stock and option grants. Because of these assumed restrictions, the grant is not purely compensatory, but imposes additional risk on the manager. As a result, the manager values the grant less (more) than market value when the remainder of his portfolio is more (less) risky than he prefers.
Throughout this paper, we define the "market value" of an executive's option as the price that a well-diversified outside investor would pay for an option with the same probability of early exercise. That is, we recognize that the value of employee stock options is likely to differ from the Black-Scholes' value because these options have features, such as vesting provisions and accelerated maturity when the holder terminates, that deviate from the assumptions underlying standard option pricing models.
The prior literature assumes that: (1) the manager is exogenously endowed with a certain amount of firm-specific wealth; (2) the remainder of his wealth is restricted to be invested in the risk-free asset; and (3) he is not allowed to rebalance his portfolio following a grant of options or stock. For example, Hall and Murphy (2000a, pp. 210-211) state:
We suppose that an executive has non-firm-related wealth of w, holds s shares of company stock; . . . w is invested at the risk-free rate; . . . all stock and options are held for ten years.
In the remainder of this section, we illustrate how these assumptions are used in prior results.
Before we begin our analysis, note that the exogenous endowment of firm stock, the exogenous equity grant, and the restriction against re-balancing suggest that it is unlikely that the manager's portfolio will be optimal either from his perspective or from the firm's perspective.
From the manager's perspective, the portfolio is obviously sub-optimal, because in the absence of a contractual requirement that he hold stock, the manager has no reason to hold an undiversified position in the firm's stock. If he were allowed to hold the market portfolio (in addition to the risk-free asset and firm stock), the manager would satisfy his risk-return preferences by investing all his wealth in some combination of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset (assuming no private information about underpricing of the firm's stock).
From the firm's perspective, even if the manager's holdings are considered part of an unmodeled contracting arrangement, the combination of the initial endowment and the equity grant result in an efficient contract only for a very restricted special case. Specifically, this special case requires that: (1) the firm writes a one period contract; (2) the length of the period is ten years or the life of the option granted; and (3) and the executive is not allowed to buy or sell stock over the length of the contract. 1 Otherwise, the above assumptions are essentially equivalent to an assumption that the manager's portfolio is constrained to be sub-optimal.
Following the notation and assumptions of prior research, we assume that the manager's total wealth is W, and that he has come to hold wealth M = M( S ) that is perfectly correlated with the firm's stock price (i. e., the manager's stock holdings and the present value of his compensation from the firm as in Lambert et al., 1991) . The firm's stock price S is a random variable with an initial value of S 0 . The initial value of his stock-based wealth is M 0 = M(S 0 ), and his other wealth is (w = W -M(S 0 )), which he invests in the risk-free asset. Following Lambert et al. (1991) , and without loss of generality, we assume that the risk-free asset and any cash are non-stochastic with a certain return of 0%. Throughout the paper, we assume that the firm's stock has a positive expected return that reflects a risk-premium above the risk-free rate.
The manager's expected utility from his holdings of the risk-free asset and his firm stock is: 
The left-hand side of (2) represents the manager's utility from the certain return on his holdings of the risk-free asset (w), plus his expected utility from the random return on his holdings of stock and the option. The right-hand side is his expected utility when he receives a certain cash payment of O M instead of the risky compensation O MV ( S ). It should be intuitive that if the compensation payment is purely compensatory, it imposes no extra risk on the manager. In this case, no risk-premium is necessary, and the certainty equivalent value of the payment is the same as a cash payment.
Now we consider how the manager values the compensation payment O MV ( S ) when it is
a risky stock option, and is not purely compensatory. 2 This set-up is essentially the same as that used by Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2000a,b,c) . Note that this analysis applies equally to the manager's valuation of a stock grant or other risky payment. The certainty equivalent value is determined by: (1) the manager's initial allocation in the firm's equity M 0 , which determines his allocation in the risk-free asset (w); and (2) the manager's risk-aversion.
Given that the manager is risk-averse and is constrained to hold firm stock and the risk-free asset, the certainty equivalent value of the option is decreasing in the manager's risk-aversion and holdings of firm stock M (e.g., Lambert et al., 1991; Hall and Murphy, 2000a,b,c) . The intuition for this result is that as the manager is endowed with greater exposure to firm risk, he places a lower value on each incremental unit of risk.
Because the manager's investment choices are constrained to the risk-free asset and firm stock (with expected return equal to the return on the risk-free asset plus a risk premium), for sufficiently low values of M 0 , the manager will value the option at more than its market value (Hall and Murphy, 2000c) . This somewhat counterintuitive result is driven by the fact that the manager cannot invest in the market portfolio to satisfy his appetite for risk. For low values of M 0 , the manager holds more than his desired amount of the risk-free asset and has less than his desired exposure to the risk premium embedded in firm stock. In this setting, the manager places a higher value on each incremental unit of risk as he is moved further below his desired risk choice, and for sufficiently low M 0 , the certainty equivalent value O M exceeds the market value O MV ( S ). By continuity, we know that there exists an M* (which is near the manager's desired allocation), where he values the option at its market value. In saying this, we make the typical assumption that the manager's utility function and the distribution of firm value are smooth and well-behaved. We summarize these results as follows: Again, we emphasize that the above observation also holds for a grant of stock.
As noted above, if the manager could invest in the market portfolio in addition to firm stock, and if he could change his investment in the market portfolio in response to the option grant, the scenario where the manager values the option above its market value would not occur.
Accordingly, some results in the prior literature are driven by constraints on the manager's investment choices.
3
The set of assumptions outlined in Observation 1 also have implications for an executive's valuation of incentives from stock and options. We define # MV as the market value option delta, which is the change in the market value of an option for a small change in the stock Hall and Murphy (2000a) demonstrate part (a). To see the intuition for part (b), remember that at M 0 < M* the manager is below his preferred allocation of firm stock. At this level of M 0 , he values the risky payoff of the option at more than its market value, and thus he values any change in the option's expected payoff at greater than its market value.
Empirical researchers often use market value deltas to measure the incentives provided by an option for the manager to increase the stock price (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995) . This incentive measure is estimated under the assumption that for each dollar the manager increases the price, he is rewarded with a value increase for each of his options equal to the market value delta. The implication of Observation 2 is that market value deltas are not accurate measures of the manager's incentives to increase stock price. This implies that the change in the market value of the manager's stock and option portfolio is a poor measure of his incentives.
Under the assumption that the executive holds more equity than he prefers (i.e., M 0 > M*), the executive applies a discount to an increase in the value of his equity portfolio. Thus, when M 0 > M*, empirical measures of equity portfolio incentives must be risk-adjusted downward (Hall and Murphy (2000c) . The amount of risk-adjustment depends on the executive's unobservable riskaversion and the unobservable amount by which the executive's holdings exceed his desired portfolio holdings.
The essential point of this section is that given restrictions on rebalancing and investment choices, the manager's valuations of stock and options and the stock and option deltas will be less than (greater than) the market valuations when the grant results in the manager holding more than (less than) his preferred exposure to firm stock. Accordingly, a manager's valuations of stock and options and incentives from stock and options must be risk-adjusted when the manager holds more than or less than his preferred exposure to firm stock. In the absence of a well-defined contracting arrangement that describes executive compensation and incentives, these riskadjustments lack a meaningful economic interpretation.
3.
Compensation valuation when an executive has a portfolio determined by a contract and can rebalance
Valuation of stock grants
In this section, we provide an alternative set of assumptions under which the manager does not attach a discount or premium to the value of stock and options. In particular, we drop the assumptions that the executive's equity holdings are exogenous to the compensation decision and that there is no rebalancing. We instead assume that an executive's contract requires (1) that the manager hold a specified amount of incentives to increase the stock price (which is equivalent to a requirement that the manager own a specified amount of firm stock and options), and (2) that the manager must rebalance his portfolio to maintain this specified level. 4 Given these assumptions, when an executive is given stock or options as compensation, he values them at their market value because he is allowed to rebalance his portfolio to remove the increased incentives.
As evidence consistent with our first assumption, we note that: (1) managerial ownership varies consistent with the prediction of stock-based contracting (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith, 2000) ; (2) firms vary equity grants to maintain target levels of equity incentives (Core and Guay, 1999) ; and (3) some firms disclose requirements that managers own an explicit quantity of stock (Core and Larcker, 2001 ).
Our second assumption, that executives rebalance their portfolios to a target incentive level, is also supported by empirical research. For example, Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that executives with high stock ownership sell stock to "undo" the new risk imposed by stock option grants, whereas executives with low ownership (potentially executives with below the contracted level of risk) do not sell off significant quantities of stock. Other evidence suggests that employees sell stock and exercise stock options in response to both new equity grants and price run-ups that increase portfolio incentives (Janakiraman, 1998; Heath, Huddart and Lang, 1999; Core and Guay, 2001) . Further, it is widely known that employees exercise stock options prior to maturity (e.g., Huddart and Lang, 1996) . Early exercise of options by risk-averse employees is generally rational only when their employment contracts allow them to reduce their risk exposure by selling the stock obtained through exercise.
5
5 Hall and Murphy (2000c) show that the manager values the ability to exercise an option early. This result follows from their assumption that the executive can sell the stock obtained through exercise, thereby reducing his risk exposure. Although this assumption seems inconsistent with their maintained assumption that the manager cannot sell stock, it does illustrate the utility gain from allowing the manager a partial rebalancing.
We assume that the firm chooses the level of the manager's incentives as part of a costminimizing contract that maximizes firm value. To distinguish between the notation of the prior section, we denote the manager's equity holdings in the firm by F = F( S ) (rather than M = M( S )). We define I t , the incentives provided by the manager's equity holdings F at time t, as the increase in the value of F for a 1% increase in the stock price, evaluated at S = S t :
We assume that the contract requires a level of incentives Iˆ, that can be satisfied with a combination of stock and options F, provided that the incentives from this combination equal I(
I(F(S 0 )) = Iˆ).
As an example, suppose the manager satisfies his incentive target Iˆ by owning 100 shares of stock when the stock price is $20. From Equation (3), the incentives Iˆ provided by these holdings are a $20 change in wealth for each 1% change in price. If the stock price increases (decreases) to $40 ($10), the manager can satisfy the target incentive level by holding 50 (200) shares of stock. This measure of market value change in the manager's stock portfolio can be converted to Jensen and Murphy's (1990) measure of managerial incentives by multiplying it by the market value of the firm, and dividing by $100,000.
We assume that wealth in excess of F ( w = W -F) is invested in the diversified portfolio (e.g., some combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio) that maximizes his utility given the constraint that he hold the specified level of incentives, I(F(S 0 ) = Iˆ). In addition, the firm pays the manager a fixed wage K, which is set so that the contract pays the agent his reservation utility, U , and compensates him for choosing the action â :
While it seems reasonable to assume that the firm selects the contract that motivates the valuemaximizing action, our results do not hinge on this requirement. For the purposes of our analysis, it is only necessary that the firm sets a target level of incentives Iˆ (value-maximizing or otherwise), that the manager is required to rebalance his equity portfolio to maintain this incentive level, and that the firm compensate the manager for the risk of holding these incentives.
To begin, we examine the grant of one share of stock and claim that, provided the executive has salable stock with market value greater than the grant date market value of the stock share granted (S 0 ), the manager's valuation of the stock share (S M ) is equal to the grant's market value (i.e., S M = S 0 ). Again, the results are not sensitive to our simplifying assumption that the equity grant is comprised of a single share of stock. 
Then: a. the manager's valuation of the stock grant is equal to the market valuation (SM = S0). b. the sensitivity of the stock value to stock price (delta) from the manager's perspective is equal to the sensitivity of market value of the stock to stock price (#M = # MV).
To see that S M = S 0 , suppose that the firm compensates the manager by granting a share of stock with market value equal to the value of the manager's cash pay K (i.e., the stock is substituted for the cash pay). Then, K = S 0 , and:
Expression (5) is the manager's expected utility after he has been granted the stock instead of his cash pay K. To get to Expression (6), the manager sells K of his stock holdings (without transactions costs). Expression (7) follows from Expression (6) by the assumption that K(S 0 ) = S 0 . Thus, once one assumes that the risk imposed on the manager is driven by a contract, the manager's valuation of a stock grant is the same as the market valuation.
Implicit in this analysis is an assumption that the employee is in compliance with the contracted level of incentives at the beginning of the period, and that the stock grant serves to provide the employee with compensation. A considerable body of research is consistent with this notion, arguing that stock and options can be an attractive form of compensation because of tax, financing and accounting considerations (Yermack, 1995; Matsunaga, 1995; Core and Guay, 2001 ).
An alternative assumption is that the firm makes the equity grant to assist the executive in reaching the required level of incentives. Core and Guay (1999) present evidence that firms grant more stock and options when CEOs hold less than the target level of incentives. In this setting, a CEO is not expected to rebalance his portfolio but instead holds the grant to avoid violating the requirements of his contract, and this assumption is supported by evidence in Core and Guay (1999) and Ofek and Yermack (2000) . The grant of stock or options reduces the amount of additional outside wealth that the CEO must invest in firm stock to satisfy the employment contract. Therefore, the CEO values the grant of stock and options at market value because this value corresponds to the amount of additional outside wealth necessary to purchase the contractually required amount of firm stock. Of course, the equity can be granted partly as compensation and partly for incentives (Janakiraman, 1998; Core and Guay, 1999; Murphy 1999) .
Given that the manager values the stock grant at its market value within this framework, it is intuitive that the manager's stock delta (sensitivity of changes in his valuation of the stock to stock price) is the same as the market value delta. To see this, note that -M , the stock delta from the manager's perspective, equals the change in the manager's valuation of a share of stock for a small change in the stock price. Assume that the manager satisfies the contract with existing holdings of N shares of stock with price S 0 , i.e., the incentives provided by F = NS 0 equal Iˆ. Now consider the effect of a small percentage increase in the stock price (e.g., 1%).
Given that the market value delta of a share of stock (-MV ) is equal to one, the manager's portfolio of firm-specific wealth increases in value to:
Now the manager has equity of 0.01NS 0 in excess of his required holdings F. Given that the contract allows him to turn the increase in value of the stock portfolio into cash equal to the change in the market value of the stock grant, the manager's per share stock delta -M is the same as the market delta (-M = -MV = 1). Accordingly, the executive values an increase in the value of his stock portfolio at market value, and the executive's incentives to increase stock price are appropriately measured as the sensitivity of the market value of stockholdings to stock price.
Valuation of stock options
The analysis in Section 3.1 for a stock grant is also applicable to a stock option grant. A stock grant is a special case of an option grant with exercise price equal to zero. For the stock grant, the tradeoff between value and incentives is in the same proportion as portfolio holdings of stock. However, for options with exercise price greater than zero, the analysis is more complicated because the tradeoff between value and incentives is not the same as common stock (e.g., a dollar's worth of stock options has a greater sensitivity to stock price than a dollar's worth of stock).
In this section, we assume that the required level Iˆ can be satisfied with a combination of stock and options F, provided that the incentives from this combination equal Iˆ (I(F(S 0 )) = Iˆ).
From the perspective of the risk-neutral firm, one option provides the manager with the same incentives as # MV shares of stock, so the firm allows the manager to satisfy his target with options at a substitution rate of # MV per option. For example, suppose the manager's incentive target is a $7 change in wealth for each 1% change in price, the stock price is $10, and # MV = 0.70 per option. From Equation (3), the manager can satisfy the target incentive level by holding 70
shares of stock, 100 options, or some combination of options and stock.
Observation 4.
Under the following assumptions:
(1) the manager is risk averse, has total wealth of W, and has a contract with the firm; (2) the contract requires the manager to own Iˆ in equity incentives; (3) the manager has saleable stock with market value incentives greater than the market value incentives of the option grant; (4) the manager can continuously rebalance his portfolio; and (5) there are no transactions costs on the sale of stock,
Then: a. the manager's valuation of a newly granted stock option is equal to the market valuation (OM = OMV). b. the sensitivity of the option value to stock price from the manager's perspective is equal to sensitivity of the market value of the option to stock price (#M = # MV).
To see that the manager's value of an option, O M , is equal to the market value, O MV , suppose that the firm compensates the manager with an option with market value equal to the Black-Scholes value. 7 Then O MV (S 0 ) = S 0 # MV -x, where S 0 is the stock price, # MV is the market value delta, and x is the expected value of the exercise price. To simplify notation, we assume that all of the manager's pay is from the option (K = O MV (S 0 )). When we substitute K = O MV (S 0 )
into Equation (4), we obtain the manager's expected utility after he has been granted the option instead of his cash pay K:
We next observe that the option provides # MV of incentives, so that the manager can still meet his incentive target after selling # MV S 0 in stock (without transactions costs), 8 as indicated by the right-hand side of Equation (10):
Because # MV S = O MV + x, the amount invested in the diversified portfolio has increased, and the amount invested in firm equity has decreased. However, the market value of the total portfolio has not changed. Further, because the manager has not increased his risk (with respect to stock price changes), the instantaneous risk of his portfolio has not increased. 9 Under the assumption that the manager can continuously rebalance his portfolio, his incentives and expected utility 7 We recognize that the value and delta of employee stock options can deviate from the Black-Scholes estimates because these options have features, such as vesting requirements and non-transferability, that deviate from exchangetraded options. However, while these features can affect the market value and delta of an option grant, they do not alter our conclusion that executives' value of an option grant is equal to the market value (i.e., what a diversified outside investor would pay for an option with the same probability of forfeiture and early exercise). 8 Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) employ a similar technique of substituting options for stock, but do this while holding expected utility constant. 9 It is also important to note the amount of risk imposed on the executive has remained constant and thus his incentives have remained constant. This occurs because the firm uses the market value option delta in determining how the manager can exchange option incentives for stock incentives. If the firm used some other delta, say # Z , it would not be the case that the risk imposed and incentives provided would be the same because var
remain the same. 10 Accordingly, once it is assumed that the contract requires a specified level of incentives and that the manager can rebalance, the manager's valuation of an option is the same as the market valuation.
Given that the manager values the option at its market value, it is intuitive that the manager's option delta is the same as the market value option delta. To see this, note that # M , the option delta from the manager's perspective, is equal to the change in the manager's valuation of the option for a small change in the stock price. Assume that the manager's required equity 
Now the manager has equity of 0.01S 0 (N + Q# MV ) in excess of the required incentives provided by F, ) ( F I , which he can turn into cash by selling stock. Given that he is allowed to turn the increase in each option's value into cash equal to the change in the option's market value, the manager's option delta # M is the same as the market value option delta (# M = # MV ). Accordingly, the incentives to increase stock price provided by the option portfolio are appropriately measured as the sensitivity of the market value of optionholdings to stock price. This last point is very important for empirical compensation research and suggests that under the assumptions outlined in this section (and in contrast to the assumptions in Section 2), the appropriate method of testing hypotheses about the structure of contracts is to examine variation in the market values of equity incentives.
Realistically, the manager will not be able to perfectly delta-hedge the risk imposed by option grants by continuously rebalancing his portfolio. This suggests that the actual variance of the manager's portfolio will be different from var(F( S )). This is because the option delta and expected exercise price are functions of S and the variance of the option payout will not equal # MV 2 var( S ) when changes in S are not small:
The term on the left side of Equation (12) is the variance when continuous rebalancing is possible, and the term on the right is the variance over a discrete period. Numerical analysis (described below) indicates that the portfolio variance over a discrete period is greater than the variance when there is continuous rebalancing, that the difference is greater when the option grant value is a greater proportion of the original stock portfolio, and that the variance increases as the time between opportunities to rebalance increases. It seems likely that most executives would be able to rebalance at least once a year. Provided that rebalancing occurs within a year, numerical analysis indicates that the increase in variance does not lead to significant decreases in the option values and deltas.
However, even under the conservative assumption that an executive rebalances his portfolio risk only once immediately following an equity grant, he will not discount the value of a stock grant, and will discount an option grant substantially less than if rebalancing is never allowed (i.e., as assumed in Section 2). For example, consider an executive who has relative risk-aversion of 2.0 and initial total wealth of $1,000,000, divided equally between the risk-free asset and firm stock. Assume his $500,000 investment in firm stock satisfies his required incentive holdings of a $5,000 wealth change per 1% price change. Further assume this executive receives options with a Black-Scholes value of $165,500 (the stock is assumed to pay no dividend, it has 30% volatility, and the risk-free rate is 6%). If he rebalances his equity incentives following the grant, but cannot rebalance again prior to the option's 10-year maturity, he values the options at $160,900 (97% of Black-Scholes). 11 Under the assumption made in previous studies that rebalancing is not allowed at any time following the grant, the executive values the options at $67,700 (a 41% discount on the Black-Scholes value, by Hall and Murphy spreadsheet, 2000b) .
Implications for relative performance evaluation (RPE)
The assumption that firms write contracts with executives who have outside wealth also calls into question the frequent observation that large executive holdings of stock and stock options are inconsistent with RPE because these holdings do not remove market risk. For example, Abowd and Kaplan (1999) remark:
Stock options reward stock price appreciation regardless of the performance of the economy or sector. Why should CEOs be rewarded for doing nothing more than riding the wave of a strong bull market? If the exercise price could be linked to measures like the S&P 500, or an index of close competitors, then executives would be rewarded for gains in stock price in excess of those explainable by market factors outside their control. If market-wide stock movements could be netted out of executive incentive schemes, then equivalent incentives could be provided while reducing the volatility of the executives' portfolios. (p. 162) 11 To solve this, we note that if the manager could rebalance continuously, he would be indifferent between holding the option or holding stock with the same amount of incentives. His utility loss from not being able to rebalance continuously occurs because the option has greater variance than the equivalent amount of stock (as shown in Equation 12). The discount on the option is equal to the certainty equivalent value that makes him indifferent between holding the option and holding an equivalent amount of stock (in each case after an initial rebalancing that results in no discount to the stock incentives).
To show the implication of our analysis for RPE, we now make the simplifying assumption that the executive prefers to invest all of his wealth, W, in the market portfolio, and that the market portfolio has return M R . We make this assumption to avoid the additional notation needed under the more realistic assumption that the executive holds a combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. We obtain the same results with this more realistic assumption. Prior to joining the firm, the manager meets his reservation utility by investing his wealth in the market portfolio:
When the firms hires the manager, his contract requires him to make an investment F in firm stock, which he finances by selling some of his holdings in the market portfolio. The firm pays him a fixed wage K, which is set so that the contract pays the agent his reservation utility, U , and compensates him for choosing the action â . We re-notate Equation (4) to make the return structure explicit:
Equation (14) states that the manager's future wealth is based on the return M R on his investment (W -F) in the market portfolio and the return S R on his investment F in firm stock. In the following two equations, we substitute our assumption that the firm's return equals the market return plus an idiosyncratic return (
Equation (16) indicates that the contract serves to increase the executive's exposure to the idiosyncratic component of the firm return, but does not alter the executive's exposure to the market return. The intuition for this result lies in the assumption that the executive prefers to hold his wealth in the diversified market portfolio. The purpose of the contract is not to change the executive's desired exposure to market risk, but to increase the executive's exposure to the idiosyncratic component of the firm return. Thus, the popular notion that executives with stock and option holdings are "inappropriately rewarded" for market-wide increases in stock prices fails to recognize that executives' wealth would likely be exposed to market risk even if they are not employed by the firm.
In this analysis, we continue to assume a contractual requirement to hold equity and that the executive can continuously rebalance, which means that F can be held in a combination of stock and options. We also note three additional assumptions of this analysis: (1) the executive prefers to hold all outside wealth in the market portfolio; (2) the executive has outside wealth at least as great as the equity holdings required by the contract (i.e., the executive does not need to borrow to finance his required investment in stock); (3) the firm's stock price moves one-for-one with the market portfolio, which is similar in spirit to a beta of one. As noted above, assumption
(1) is not essential to our analysis. In addition, if we assume instead that the executive can costlessly borrow and take long and short positions in the market index, we do not need assumptions (2) and (3). 12 Although we recognize that these are simplifying assumptions, our point is that contracts are likely to have features consistent with Holmstrom's (1982) prediction that compensation contracts filter out systematic noise through RPE.
Conclusion
We illustrate the importance of considering contracting arrangements between firms and their executives when assessing an executive's valuation of stock and option grants. We assume that firms and executives enter into contracts that: (1) require executives to hold specified levels of equity incentives, and (2) allow executives to rebalance their portfolios when the risk exposure deviates from the contracted level. Under these assumptions, we show that: (1) executives value grants of stock and options at their market values; (2) stock and option deltas are the market value deltas; and (3) compensation contracts have features consistent with RPE. We believe that these results are useful to researchers who study the cost and incentive effects of observed contracts under the assumption that observed contracts are on average efficient. An immediate implication of our findings is to lend support to empirical studies that use market value and changes in market values to estimate the value or incentives of executive stock and option portfolios.
Some previous studies argue that stock and option grants are a costly form of compensation because managers discount the value of these securities (e.g., Hall and Murphy, 2000c) . These studies restrict the manager to hold an exogenously endowed position in firm stock and the risk-free asset, and do not allow the manager to rebalance his portfolio in response to receiving a grant of stock or options. Under these restrictions, the equity grant imposes additional risk and incentives on the manager, and as a result is not purely compensatory. We argue that when equity grants are assumed to increase incentives, it is inappropriate to compare the cost of the equity grant to the firm with the cost of making a purely compensatory payment to the manager.
While we think that it can be interesting to consider that certain firms are not optimizing and how this behavior influences compensation plans, it is critical that the researcher identify an alternative objective function for the non-optimizing firms. For example, Hall and Murphy (2000a) adopt a framework where new grants of options impose additional and excessive incentives on executives. In this setting, they derive the "optimal" incentive-maximizing option exercise price and the cost differential between option compensation and cash compensation.
However, these results are difficult to interpret without a well-defined alternative to profitmaximizing behavior. That is, when firms are assumed to impose risk on executives beyond the profit-maximizing level, how should one interpret a measure of the "cost" of granting stock or options, or rank comparisons of the sub-optimizing firms on the basis of this "cost"?
